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Abstract 
We develop and test a structural asymmetric information transaction model to char­
acterize the price impact of information when markets are thin. Since orders are accepted 
individually, the model allows for transaction costs and brokerage fees. Equilibrium de­
mands mixed entry strategies on the part of potentially-informed traders. Estimation of 
the structural parameters is performed using a maximum likelihood procedure on NYSE 
data. The price impact of information is found to be positive and significant, but eco­
nomically small. This is because while the amount of private information is substantial, 
the quality of the information signals is quite poor. Insiders do not trade small quantities, 
which suggests that their ability to divide orders is limited by transaction costs. 
•we wish to thank Richard Green, David Marshall, Robert Miller, Ken Singlet.on, Chester Spatt, 
John Piazza, a former specialist on the American Stock Exchange, for valuable guidance and discussions 
in the formulation of this problem. 
Introduction 
This paper develops and tests an asymmetric information market transaction model to 
explain the price and volume moments that characterize intra.day transaction-by-transaction 
trade on the NYSE. We model the fact that intra.day transactions on the NYSE are temporally 
dispersed and that most such trades are completed independently. Thin markets imply that 
potentially-informed speculators must adopt mixed information acquisition/ entry strategies in 
equilibrium. Thin intra.day markets also lead the specialist's pricing function to be invariant 
to fluctuations in expected volume. Because spreads can also arise due to transaction costs, we 
consider the possibility that the specialist or dealer incurs both fixed and variable costs when 
completing transactions. 
In contra.st to previous literature where trades a.re necessarily pooled (e.g. Kyle [ 1985], 
Adma.ti and Pfleiderer [ 1988] ), characterization of the equilibrium yields explicit implications 
for transaction-by-transaction behavior as a function of the model's structural parameters 
during the trading day. A further advantage of the transaction-by-transaction formulation is 
that it can allow for transaction costs and brokerage fees. We use the Fitch transaction-by­
transaction NYSE price and volume data to test the model. In contrast to the previous literature 
( e.g. Glosten and Harris [ 1989] , Hasbrouck [ 1991 ] ), rather than estimate the reduced form price 
impact of information, we estimate the structural para.meters which comprise the price impact. 
We exploit the nonlinear restrictions provided by the model to estimate the probability that 
the specialist faces an informed trader, the amount and quality of inside information, the cost 
of information acquisition, and transaction costs. 
Neither ordinary nor generalized least squares are efficient estimation procedures even when 
bid-as/,: indicators are observable, much less imputed from quote data as in Lee and Ready 
[1991] .  This is because mixed entry strategies on the part of the potentially-informed imply 
that price cha.nges-m1d-1;ra.ded .. quantities -are -conditiomi..Hy-·but-not "uncorrditionally normally 
distributed. The mixed unconditional distribution for volume helps identify the probability 
that a particular trader is informed. Given the restrictions of our model the efficient estimation 
procedure maximizes the joint likelihood function for price and volume. 
Empirically, we find that the price impact of informa.tion is positive and significant. However, 
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this impact is economically unimportant for small orders . Even for large orders, the tariff is 
only on the order of the bid-ask spread. The price impact of information appears to vary 
throughout the day, but it does not necessarily match the U-shaped volume pattern found 
in previous research (e.g. Wood, Mclnish a.nd Ord [ 1985) ). It is, however, highest near the 
open and close. The reason for the low price impact of information does not appear to be
a lack of information coming to the market in the intra.day period _,the ·magnitude of the 
informational innovations appears to be larger tha.n the bid-ask spread. Rather, the signals 
that the informed traders receive are very noisy, particularly in the middle of the day. Variations 
in the price impa.ct of information appea.r to be ca.used not so much by intradaily fluctuations 
in the a.mount of inside information, as by fluctuations in the quality of information. 
Insiders a.re found to trade far greater quantities than uninformed traders, up to 20 times 
larger. This suggests tha.t the fixed costs of tr a.ding a.re high enough relative to the price impact 
of information to ma.ke splitting orders una.ttra.ctive. 
As a. consequence, we then integrate tra.sa.ction costs into the model. The transaction costs 
formulation precludes identification of some of the structural parameters, but both a per share 
transaction cost and a quantity cutoff below which insiders will not trade (so there is no adverse 
selection) can be estimated. The resulting equilibrium pricing function is kinked. We reject the 
linear pricing rule in favor of the kinked rule. 
Estimation of the pricing relationship for NYSE stocks beyond linear pricing requires that
the model incorporate the thin na.ture of the market. Terry [ 1986] shows that during the day 
there are often long intervals when no transaction occurs1, and that consecutive trades are
generally sufficiently separated temporally. Bronfma.n [ 1990] notes that trades are accepted in­
dependently, even when volume is very hea.vy - e.g . .5000 trades per day:2 intraday transactions
a.re almost never pooled on the NYSE.
1He finds t.hat the average time between trades for stocks on t11e Dow�O and for all NYSE stocks are 2.7 and 
15.2 minutes respectively on December 31, 1989. Further, since these averages are (total trading minutes)/(total
number of firms), the weight t .o the heavily traded stocks is proportionally greater. Terry also provides an equally 
weighted average for the Dow 30 - an average of 4.3 minutes bet.ween trades.
2USX volume on 23 October 1989. 
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In models such as those of Admati and Pfleiderer [1988), or Foster and Viswanathan [1988], 
which restrict potentially-informed agents to pure strategies, an equilibrium with insider trading 
only exists when informed traders transact each period. Consequently, the market must always 
be sufficiently thick that each period the (necessarily) multiple transactions of informed and 
uninformed traders can be pooled together to obtain one net transaction price. The predictions 
of this class of models differ crucially from the model here. In particular, they predict that the
specialist's pricing function fluctuates with expected volume. This precludes the possibility of 
estimation because of the substantial systematic and unsystematic variation in intraday volume. 
In contrast, when the thin nature of the market is modeled explicitly, the resulting equilibrium 
pricing function is invariant to fluctuations in expected volume, even when transaction costs 
are incorpora.ted. It is this invariance which allows estimation. 
The reason for this invariance, is tha.t when markets are thin, potentially-informed traders 
randomize their decisions to acquire information and trade. In equilibrium, a potentially­
informed a.gent who adopts a randomized strategy must be indifferent a.bout whether or not 
to acquire information: he must expect zero profits net of information costs. To effect this 
outcome, the sampling probabilities of the informed must be perfectly correlated with the 
arrival rate of liquidity traders. 
Because ea.ch transaction is met individually, we can consider the possibility that the market 
makers incur both a fixed fee and a per-share cost to completing ea.ch individual transaction. 
If there a.re transaction costs, a pooling model is inappropriate because buyers and sellers may 
be charged different prices. In addition, the number of trades affects transaction costs, since, 
when there is a fixed fee, additional costs are incurred if a. large order is split into smaller ones. 
With fixed transaction costs, sma.11 trades contain no information a.bout the asset innovation so 
that there is no adverse selection for such trades. Insiders do not trade small quantities because 
the transaction costs exceed the expected profits derived from their information. For larger 
orders, a.n adverse selection component to the specialist's pricing function exists, but is smaller 
than it would be in the absence of these costs. The greater the fraction of the expected trading 
costs (information acquisition and fixed transacting costs) incurred by the informed which are 
transaction costs, the flatter is the specialist's pricing function, the greater the transaction 
volume level below which informed agents do not transact, and the less likely an agent is to 
seek inside information. Finally, the transaction costs induce the negative serial correlation in 
the price series observed in NYSE data. 
2. The model
Consider a market run by a risk neutral specialist. During a day of T periods the market 
is open from period To until period T, 1 < To < T. A new day starts immediately after the 
previous da.y's close. We characterize trade in the intra.day trading periods T0 + 1 to T - 1: 
At open and close, different market clearing mechanisms which involve pooling of transactions 
operate, so that an assumption that simultaneous transactions are handled independently is 
inappropriate (see Stoll and Whaley (1990]). Under weak regularity conditions (see Bernhardt 
and Hughson [1992a.] ), liquidity traders who can choose when to trade only trade at open and 
close. Hence we restrict our attention in the intra.day markets to two types of. risk neutral 
traders: uninformed liquidity traders who trade a fixed (stochastic) quantity in a fixed period, 
and potentially informed traders who can pay a cost to acquire inside information. 
These a.gents trade claims to a risk free asset with single period gross return r and a single 
risky asset whose value in period T is given by: 
T 
Fr = rr Fo + L rr-tDtHt,t:=:l 
where Dt, the informational innovation is a normal independently distributed random variable 
with zero mean and variance Vt, and Ht is an indica.tor function which is equal to one if there is 
an innovation in period t and is equal to zero otherwise. \iVhen innovations are infrequent, trades 
would cluster a.round informational events, because the informed would only trade then. The 
probability of an innovation in any given period is given by I· F0 is the liquidation value of the
asset at the end of the previous trading day, and includes (discounted) any future deterministic 
component of the firm. Fr is the liquidation value after the current trading day's close. Both
Fo and Fr can be interpreted as common perceptions of the value of the risky asset at those
moments. The impact of the risk-free rate on the intra.day evolution of price moments is shown 
to be small in Bernhardt and Hughson [1992a] because the entire risk-free return is earned 
overnight, so we set r = 1 to reduce the notational burden. 
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On the NYSE, the actual receipt of securities is invariant to the intraday timing of trades. 
At each moment in a day agents trade claims to the risky asset whose value is given by its 
worth at close. The value in period r of these claims is given by 
'T 
Vr = Er[Vr] = Fo + l: 8tHt.t=l 
In period t, Ft-l is common knowledge, so that uncertainty about the risky asset's time t
value only concerns whether there was an innovation in period t, and if so, its value, Ot. Thus,
information is only good for one period. 
Liquidity ( noise ) traders arrive at the market in period t according to an independently
distributed stochastic process with mean arrival rate 17t and positive variance. Noise trader k
cannot be distinguished as uninformed. He has inelastic demand, Zkt, which is the realization
of an independently and identically distributed normal random variable with zero mean and 
variance er. The parameter 171 is a measure of market depth - when 17t is small, there is little
background trading noise in which an informed agent can hide. 
Each period t there are M potentially-informed traders. Potentially-informed trader i can
pay a cost c to attempt to find inside information about an innovation in t. If an innovation
occurs in t, he receives a private signal about its value, Ot + Eit, where Eit is an independently
and identically distributed normal random variable with zero mean and variance </>. Since, in 
period t + 1, 81 becomes common knowledge, this information is valuable to trader i only in
period t. If there is no innovation, the information acquisition investment is wasted. 
Given his signal o1 + Eit a.gent i selects a demand, x£1(bt + Eit), to maximize expected profits:
conditional on his signal. The probability of acquiring a signal, 7r£t, maximizes his expected
profits within that period given his subsequent profit-maximizing demand if informed: 
The market is made by a specialist and many floor traders. In accord with practice on the NYSE, 
we assume tha.t orders received by the market makers during the intra.day trading period are 
,5 
handled independently3 so that the price schedule is updated after nearly every trade.
In the intrada.y trading periods, market makers are essentially indistinguishable. A market 
maker selects his pricing function taking into account the subsequent strategic response of the 
potentially-informed traders. Each period, he first selects a linear pricing function which details 
for each possible transaction level, the price at which the market maker is willing to transact. 
Agents then look at the price schedule and decide whether to become informed and/or trade. 
Risk neutrality4 and competition together imply that the identity of the agent who takes the
opposite side of each order is irrelevant. 
An uninformed risk-neutral market maker selects his pricing function taking into account 
the subsequent strategic response of the traders. A market maker does not know the identity 
of the agent with whom he transacts (informed or uninformed). Therefore, the common price 
schedule offered by the dealers is such that they earn zero expected profits ex-ante: 
for a.11 t, where w; equals x; if the trader is informed and Zt otherwise.
3. Equilibrium
An equilibrium is a pricing function Pt ( w1); a set of sampling probabilities {'7ri''t}, i = 
1, ... , M, 7rj1 E [O, 1); an associated set of demands for the risky asset by the potentially
informed agents {.Tj1(b1 +Ei1)}; for all t such that given p;(wt),
3vVe think of each period lasting only a couple of minutes, so that multiple orders in the same period are 
unlikely. In the unlikely event. of multiple orders, the market makers do not condition their price schedule on the 
number of traders in the market. 
4 For securities where the specialist handles only a small fraction of trades in a stock, inventory cost models 
m ay be difficult to estimate. Since a market maker is relatively free to pick and choose which transactions to 
take, it is straightforward for him to keep a balanced port .folio . In equilibrium, the m arket m aker who takes a 
transaction is likely to be the one who benefits most from the resulting rebalancing - and hence offers the most 
attractive price. One might . even expect the inventory cost component to the bid-ask spread to be negative on 
occasion . This may explain the weak inventory effects found by Madhavan and Smidt [1992], and Hasbrouck 
and Sofianos [1992]. For securities where the specialist completes most trades, an inventory cost model might be
estimable, although our competitivity assumption would be violated. 
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1. If agent i is informed, he selects his demand, xi1( Ot + Eit), to maximize expected profits:
2. The probability that potentially-informed agent chooses to become informed, rr;t, maxi­
mizes expected profits given his subsequent behavior if informed,
M AXir;tE [1rit [M AXx;1E[Htxit[Ft - p;(xit)Jl8t + Eit, Ht] - c) l · 
3. The informed traders earn zero expected profits in equilibrium.
Es,+tit [ 1rit [M AXXit [Ex;1,81,lit [Htxit[Ft - v;(xit)]l8t + €jt, Ht] - c]] l = 0.
4. The market maker accepting the order earns zero expected profits transaction-by-transaction
(but not necessarily transaction-size-by-transaction-size)
Given ea.ch a.gent's time t information set and the optimal strategies of all other agents, each
a.gent maximizes his expected profits, and the dealer earns zero expected profits each period. 
3 . 1. The p eriod problem
In the period problem, we first determine the specialist's pricing function. The specialist 
adopts a linear pricing rule , Pt = Ft-l + AtWt, for the risky asset which yields him zero expected 
profits conditional on the orders he meets . Given this pricing rule, we then determine the 
equilibrium sampling and trading probabilities for the traders, and the demands of the informed. 
To reduce notation we suppress the time subscripts. 
An agent who has paid a cost c to become informed solves: 
(1) 
Since intra.day transactions are accepted independently, the informed agent knows that volume, 
w, consists only of his own demand, Xi, and substitutes for w in (1) .  Differentiating with respect 
to Xi and applying the projection theorem yields: 
v(  8 + fi) 





f3 = 2,\( v + ¢) (3
) 
Since 7r is the probability a trader attempts to acquire information and / is the probability of
an informational event, let () = .,.,��' be the probability from the market maker's perspective
that a given trader is informed. The market maker's zero expected profit condition requires 
that he equate expected losses to the informed to the expected gains from trading with the 
uninformed: 
OE[/3[8 + Ei][8 - ,\f3[8 + i:;]]) = [1 - O]E(z,\z).
Taking the unconditional expectation of both sides and solving for ,\ yields: 
,\ = 
Of3v 
()f32(v + ¢ )  + (1- Oa) 
Substituting for /] a.nd solving for ,\ yields: 
This implies that: 
,\ = 
vfa 
2J(v + ¢ )( 1- Oa) 
(3 = 
1 - Ba





The expected number of informed can be found by equating the expected profits of the informed 
with the acquisition cost, c. The market makers' zero profit condition implies that his expected 
losses to the informed, �c, must equa.l his expected profits from the noise traders, \�8: 
Be 
( 1 - B),\a = -. or: 17,\a = 7rc ,
I 
(8) 
when we substitute for 7r and 17. Substituting for ,\ a.nd solving yields:
P roposition 1 The probability that the nwr/,:et mcd:er trades with an informed agent in period
t E (To, T), given there is a transaction is given by:
")'2CTV2 Bt = . 12av2 + 4c2( v + ¢ ) (9
) 
The linear coefficients of the market maker's pricing function and an informed agent's demand
function are given by
') /V� 
,\ = ; 4c( v + </>) 
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2c 
/] = -. 
V/ (
10) 
Observe that as sampling costs fall, the conditional probability that the market maker faces an 
informed trader increases. As sampling costs become arbitrarily large, or the probability of an 
event becomes arbitrarily small, the probability of meeting an informed trader goes to zero. 
The expected number of potential traders tha.t become informed is given by: 
/GV2TJ 
7r= ----
4c2( v + cf>)
(11) 
The equilibrium pricing function is invariant to the number of potential intermediaries when 
intra.period trades are accepted individually. There a.re multiple equilibria in the following 
sense: Only the expected number of informed a.gents is identified by the market maker's zero 
profit conditions. Beca.use of the linea.rity of the price schedule and its invariance to the actual 
number of arrivals within a period, the market maker's expected profits are unaffected by how 
expected entry is divided among the potentially-informed. Bernhardt and Hughson [1992a) 
show that standard equilibrium refinements select the equilibrium with a single potentially­
informed trader. \Ne therefore focus on this equilibrium, so that 7r becomes the probability of 
informed trade. 
The pricing function, >., in ( 10) is independent of the aggregate variance of liquidity trade,
a .  This result differs markedly from tha.t in Adma.ti and Pfleiderer, whose equilibrium >. is 
decreasing in a .  Notice that here, the probability of informed entry, 7r, is linear in a. The 
market maker's profits from the uninformed a.re a.lso linear in a: the two effects exactly offset 
each other. This invariance occurs in markets which a.re too thin for Admati and Pfleiderer's 
equilibrium to exist. The non-existence of pure strategy equilibria when markets are too thin 
to support the constant presence of an insider follows because when insiders are absent the 
specialist should not set a positive bid-ask spread. but then this would draw insiders . . .. 
3.2.  Transaction costs and brokerage fees
Suppose a.gents now face an additional ta.riff to execute their trades, c1 lwl + c2 , where c1 is
a. per-share transaction cost pa.id to the market maker and c2 is a dea.dweight cost incurred if
the trade is executed. We consider this alternative specification to bring the model into rough 
conformity with the data. If c1 is positive, the transaction price series exhibits the negative
serial correlation that is observed in NYSE data.  One can think of c2 as the (unmodeled) 
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opportunity cost of the potentially informed agent's time. Thus, c1 is incorporated directly in
the transaction price recorded on the Fitch tapes, while c2, the deadweight cost, is not.5 Hence,
c1 is essentially half the bid-ask spread (see e.g. Roll [1984)). 
In addition to determining whether to obtain information, the potentially-informed must 
also determine whether it is optimal to trade given the signal obtained. The ex-ante expected 
fixed costs to entry faced by a potentially-informed trader (which include c, the cost of infor­
mation acquisition) become: 
c* = c + 2c2 [l - <I>( 8 + €)*],
where <I>( 8 + E)* is the cumulative distribution function for a normal random variable with zero
mean and variance v + </>. and 2[1 - <I>( 8 + E )*] is the probability that an informed trader receives
a signal sufficiently "large" that he expects profits from trade which exceed the transactions 
costs. This then is the probability that he actually trades given that he is informed. The market 
maker's conjectured pricing function is: 
Pi Ft-1 + AtWt + C1 if Wt� w(8 + €)*,
Pt Ft-1 + C1 if 0 '.S Wt< w(8 + €)*,
Pt Ft-1 - C1 if -wt(8 + E)* '.S Wt< 0,
P1 Ft-1 - At.Wt - C1 if Wt< -w(8 + E)*,
where w(o + €)* = w" is the critical trading quantity and 1(8 + f)*I is the associated maximum
signal below which no adverse selection problem exists. For small trading quantities, the profits 
an that informed agent expects from his information are exceeded by his transaction (and/ or 
brokerage) fees. For signals which would lead to such trades, it is not profitable for the informed 
trader to exploit his limited private information. 
The market maker expects zero profits net of transaction costs for any trade. For small 
trades, there is no adverse selection since the informed do not trade such small quantities. 
Glosten and Harris [1989] attempt to distinguish econometrically the transaction cost com­
ponents, but their formulation does not recognize that when information is costly to obtain, 
5This specification is chosen in part for tract.ability. It also builds on Glosten and Harris [1989] who do not 
find a fixed transact.ion cost to be significantly different. from zero. 
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the adverse selection problem vanishes for small transaction quantities. This may lead them 
to underestimate the price impact of information. Here, although closed-form solutions for >. 
cannot be obtained, we can characterize it explicitly and solve the model numerically. Glosten 
[1987] speculates that "Since statistical properties of transaction prices are typically a function 
of both the spread and the composition of the spread, there is no obvious candidate for a simple 
spread-estimation procedure based on the moments of transactions returns ... Furthermore, the 
results suggest than any attempt to estimate the spread from transaction prices should esti­
mate two components." We agree with his sentiment that it is important to capture the two 
components, and find that the solution takes an estimable form. 
A solution to the more general problem is not more difficult, but to ease notation, we restrict 
attention to the case where I = 1. Let It = 1 * sgn[wt]. Dropping time subscripts,
Lemm.a 2 The demand function for an informed agent is:
Xi(b + E )  (12) 
(13) 
Proof: See appendix 2. • 
To solve the equilibrium problem we break it clown into three steps: 
1. Solve for the critical signal ( b + E )* below which no informed tra.der tra.des. 
2. From the zero profit condition for the market maker, we solve for the market maker's
pricing function, >., for an arbitrary entry probability, 7r. 
3. From the condition· that'"the ex-ante e:x:pected ·profits '{')f-a.n�informed·agent must be 7rc*,
we solve for the entry probability, 7r.
The informed agent's expected profits from trading equal: 
(14) 
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We first solve for E[b2lb + €] and E[bflb + €]. 
Le1nma 3 
[i:21 i: ] v
2(b+t-)2 v¢ E[i: li: ]=v¢(
b+€)2






Proof: See appendix 2. 
Substituting the results of lemma 3 and f3 = 
2
,\(�Hl into (14) yields:
EIT = /3v
(b + € )
2 
- c1I/3(f, + €) + f3
ci(v + ¢).




This value must be positive for an informed a.gent to trade. Note that even absent fixed costs, 
there remains a critical value below which informed traders will not transact, 
When c2 is added, to determine the critical signal ( b + €)* below which an informed agent does
not trade, we must first find the signal ( f, + €)' at which the expected profits from transacting
equal c2, his deadweight trading cost. At (f, + €)1, there is a discrete jump in the specialist's
pricing function ( see figure 2). But (b + €)*must be less than (b + €)'. Otherwise, an informed
a.gent could profit by trading the quantity w' minus some very small quantity, face no adverse
selection ta.riff, and make positive profits. To find w�, we must determine the slope of the 
specialist's pricing function and find where it crosses the horizontal line, Pt = Ft-1 + ci, where
c1 reflects the specialist's per-share cost of doing business. This intersection determines w* .
A consequence is that between w* and w', no equilibrium pricing function exists where both
the specialist and informed traders earn zero expected profits. If the pricing function is fiat
between w* and w' the informed trader profits, and if the function is linear (with slope A) then
the market maker profits. We disregard this issue in the later empirical sections. 
Equating expected profits, Ell, with trading cost, c2, yields:
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If C1 = 0,
Otherwise: 
1(8 + E)'I = 2(v + ¢)
c2
(3v 
l(6 + E)'I = c1I(v + </>) + 2(v + <f>)vxc;
_ 
v v 
Equation ( 4) no longer details the zero expected profit condition for the market maker because
the conditional probability the market maker faces an informed trader is altered - an informed 
agent trades only if the absolute value of his signal exceeds ( 6 + E )' . For smaller signals it is
not profitable for an informed agent to transact. Conditional on the volume exceeding w', the 
market maker recognizes that he may be trading with an informed trader. The market maker's 
zero expected profit condition then requires that expected profits net of transaction costs from 
trading with uninformed liquidity traders equal his losses from trading with the informed: 
( 15) 
where fs(8). fl(E), and f::( z )  are the normal probability density functions for 6, E, and z respec­
tively. Solving implicitly for >., we obtain:
>. = 
7r 1 f�cx. f5+(5+l)'[v2(8 + E)2 - 2c1I(v + ¢)(6 + E) + ci(v + </>)2]fs(8)fl(E)dEd6
-;] • 4(v + ¢)2 J;T(;''+l)' z2 fz(z)dz 
( 16) 
The right-hand side of (16 ) is continuously decreasing in >., approaching infinity as >. goes to
zero and zero as >. approaches infinity. Hence for a given 7r, there is a unique solution for >..
Observe that only the ratio * enters so that once a.gain >. is invariant to fluctuations in 77,
although now, ,\ is a complicated function of a, the variance of uninformed trade.
To solve for the equilibrium entry probability for the informed, 7r, we equate expected rev­
enues from being informed with expected costs of becoming informed (including the possibility 
of trading ): 
Here we write >. explicitly as a function of 7r. Observe that both sides of the equation are
continuous and that the left-hand side is monotone decreasing approaching infinity as 7r goes 
to zero and zero a.s 7r approaches 1. The right-hand side is monotone decreasing, approaching 
c + c2 as 7r goes to zero, and approaching c as 7r approaches 1. Hence a solution exists, and one
can show that the equilibrium sampling probability is unique. 
One can integrate and explicitly write equations (16) and (17) as functions of normal dis­
tributions. For instance, if fl, € and z are each standard normal random variables, and c1 is set
to zero, these equations are shown in appendix 3 to reduce to
17 
�e-2c2>. + 1 - <I>(2vc;.\)
A= ��������____,,===-� 
4( c + 2c2( 1 - <I>(2Jc;,\))) 
( 0 + E)1 = J8c;>:
2A(l - <l>(c2/2A) + {1fite=ff) 
c + 2c2( 1 - <I>(2vc;,\)) 
where we write "pi" to distinguish the number from the sampling probability. Note that A can 
be solved for directly ( numerically ) and then resubstituted to obtain (fJ + E)', and * · In figures
3 - 6,  the relationship between transaction costs and the endogenous variables are illustrated.
Observe how quickly the probability that a. potentially-informed agent actually seeks to acquire 
inside information falls as transaction costs rise. For example , if c = . 5, and brokerage and
transaction fees, c2, a.re even one tenth the cost of information acquisition, c, the probability of
acquiring inside information falls by 1.5%, if total expected costs are held constant. For c = 1, 
the reduction is even greater - 20%. In response to the decreased likelihood of trading with an 
insider, the market maker pares the adverse selection component, A, of his pricing function by 
8%. That is, small tra.nsa.ction costs can have significant effects on the market maker's pricing
function. Note also how the minimum trade size such that an informed trader is willing to trade 
increases with brokera.ge fees. The informed trader requires an ever more promising signal for it 
to be profitable for him to transact as these fees increase, Consequently, there are more signals 
for which the informed trader will walk away from the_market..maker'.s_desk. .As brokerage fees
rise, the probability an informed agent trades fa.1ls accordingly. 
It is possible to further characterize the equilibrium solution when c1 = 0. Define the
locus of combinations of c and c2 which yield the same equilibrium expected cost, c*: c* = 
c + 2[1 - <I>( b + E)*]c2. Then, writing the equilibrium A as a function of the fraction of costs
1-4 
which are due to information acquisition, cC. , >.( cC.) must be increasing in its argument. For
suppose that it were constant. Then for any given signal the informed would demand the same 
quantity for all c, conditional on actually trading. But then the informed agent's (positive) 
expected profits in those trading states are the same for different sampling costs, c. However,
the greater is c then the lower is c2, so there a.re more signals at which the informed profitably 
trade. Since expected costs are equal to c"' in each scenario, it must be that net expected profits
are greater the larger the fraction c represents of expected costs. But net expected profits must
be zero independent of the composition of costs, a contradiction. Consequently, as the costs 
of becoming informed consume a smaller proportion of c*, the adverse selection component of
the bid-ask spread falls, and the trade volume below which no adverse selection component 
to the bid-ask spread exists rises. A corollary is that, in order for the market maker to earn 
zero expected profits, the equilibrium probability that an agent acquires information must fall 
as c comprises a. smaller fraction of c*. These observations are illustrated in figures 7 and 8
where the relationship between cc• and the endogenous variables are detailed for expected total 
trading costs for the informed of c* = . .5 .
Observe too that at least some liquidity traders benefit from larger transaction costs - they 
may actually be helped by a tax on transactions. If transaction costs increase marginally, that 
increase may be sufficient that it ceases to be in the interest of informed traders to trade the 
same quantity as some liquidity trader. The liquidity trader incurs a marginal increase in 
costs due to the transaction cost, but receives a lump sum benefit because the adverse selection 
component to price no longer exists. Similarly, because >. falls as transaction costs rise, liquidity 
traders who trade sufficiently large quantities also benefit. In contrast, liquidity traders who 
trade very small quantities lose as transaction costs increase because the degree of adverse 
selection the market maker faces for such transaction volumes is similarly small. See figure 9. 
Ex ante, however, liquidity traders do not gain from an increase in transaction costs. 
If c1 > 0, there is negative serial correlation in the price series which provides additional
information about the sign of w. The entire trading history is now relevant because the fixed 
transaction costs imply prices no longer follow a martingale. The estimate of c1 here (and in
Glosten and Harris [1989]) provides a lower bound on the cost of trading since the total trading 
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cost presumably includes brokerage fees. A more relevant statistic may be the estimate of w*, 
the smallest trade insiders are willing to make. This value is unaffected by the division of 
transaction costs into observed (price) and unobserved (brokerage fee) components. From w*, 
the estimate of brokerage fees can then be unraveled. 
4. Estimation procedure
We assume that all trades are processed sequentially as they appear on the tape, and an 
informational innovation occurs ea.ch period. 
Estimation without transaction costs when t he sign of w is unobservable. 
Let there be n transactions and let prices, volumes, and indicator functions be indexed by 
time, not by transaction. Estimation is accomplished by ta.king price differences from successive 
trades. Suppose adjacent transactions occur a.t times s - t and s. Recall:
We can rewrite JJs as:
Then, 
s-1 
]Js = Fs-t-1 + L br + AsWs.
r=s-t 
s-1 
.3.ps = Ps - Ps-t = [8s-t - ,\s-tWs-tJ + L br + AsWs.
r=s-t+l 
( 18) 
[8s-t - As-tWs-tl is the projection error due to the information released about 8s-t immediately
following the trade at s - t. L:�-::�-t 8r is the balance of the information released between the
two trades. Thus, ( 18) can be writen as: 
( 19) 
Although quantities traded by both informed and uninformed traders are normal random vari­
ables with zero mean and variances /32( v + ¢ )  and er, and 8 is itself normally distributed, e8 and
W8 are mixtures of normal distributions. The mixtures are due not only to the unobservability of
the sign of w ( as in Glosten and Harris [1989] ) ,  but also because informed and uninformed agents 
(who trade quantities drawn from different normal distributions) cannot be distinguished from 
each other. These additional mixtures identify the structural parameters of the model. Our 
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estimation procedure, which maximizes the unconditional likelihood of jointly observing the se­
quence of price changes {6.p} = {Lipi, . . .  , 6.pn}, and the volume sequence {lwl} = {lw1 I ,  . . .  , lwnl} 
is given in appendices 3 and 5. Were Ws observable or the (noisy) Lee-Ready [1991) procedure
used to identify the sign of the trade from the quote data, ordinary least squares would provide 
consistent but inefficient parameter estimates. The inefficiency is due to the unobservability of 
the identities of the traders (informed or uninformed). 
Simply assuming that price increases (decreases) indicate buy (sell) orders clearly biases 
the results upward. In Table 4 we compare the >. obtained using the correct procedure with 
estimates of >. obtained using OLS, assuming that price increases (decreases) indicate buy (sell) 
orders, and la.ck of price movement indicates that the sign of the bid-ask indicator is the same 
as that of the previous transaction. 
5. T he data
The Fitch data.base of all transactions for all stocks on the NYSE between January 2,  1980 
and January 6, 1981 is used to test the model. vVe remove securities which experience stock 
splits or receive distributions other than normal ca.sh dividends. Regular dividends are paid 
overnight, and their effects a.re felt only at open. For the remaining stocks, we examine the 
entire price series. forming price differences between adjacent trades. Since prices on open and 
close may be determined by call auctions or de facto call auctions, the first trade of the day, 
the la.st trade of the day, and all other trades processed at these times a.re eliminated. All 
price differences which contain these trades are also removed. We also remove trades a.round 
trading halts, trades which appear out of order on the tape, trades which are marked with a 
correction code or certain condition codes, trades at negative prices (known errors), and trades 
with price changes of more than 203. For frequently traded securities, we restrict attention to 
the first .5000 remaining price differences. Final]�·. whe11 comparing parameters across different 
time periods, we· elimimi:te price ·cha:nges ·which cross ·hourly-boundaries. 
6. Testable implications
In the absence of transaction costs, the theory provides non-linear restrictions which identify 
the structural para.meters of the specialist's pricing function: v, the a.mount of inside informa-
17 
tion, </>, the noise in the signal, c, the cost of information, and cr, the variance of uninformed
trade. These structural parameters in turn provide information about other quantities of in­
terest: >., the slope of the specialist's pricing function; e, the probability that the specialist
faces an informed trader; and the average quantities traded by both informed and uninformed 
agents. Estimation of the structural parameters allows us to distinguish for example whether 
a high >. is due to more private information, v ,  or a less noisy signal, </>-1•
We estimate the pricing function over different intra.day intervals to see if there is systematic 
variation in it over the course of the da.y. \file then test the linear pricing rule against a quadratic
alternative. Finally, we test the restrictions which identify the structural parameters against an 
alternative which does not impose the restrictions. There are six reduced form parameters, four 
structural para.meters, and two nonlinear restrictions which map the reduced form parameters 
to the structural parameters. 
When transaction costs a.re integrated into the model, identification of some structural 
parameters becomes infeasible. However, we can still estimate the probability that a particular 
trader is informed as well as the average quantities traded by informed and uninformed traders. 
In addition, both a per-share transaction cost, c1, and a quantity cutoff, w*, below which there 
is no adverse selection are estimated. Unlike the linea.r pricing rule estimated by Glosten and 
Harris [1989], the resulting pricing function is kinked. We test the linear pricing rule against 
the kinked alternative. 
7. Results
7 .1. Estimation of >. when the sign of ...: is unobservable
\i\Te first estimate the slope of the specialist's pricing function, >. when the sign of w is
not observable. Since here, we are just comparing these >. with those obtained using the 
OLS procedure detailed in section 4, we simplify the estimation problem qy assuming that 
var( ei) is constant. While our theory implies that var( ei) is ceteris paribus linear in the time
between trades, we justify this simplifying assumption because, when we allowed var( ei) to be 
linear in the time between transactions, (i.e. var( ei) = k0 + k1 t, where t is the time between
tl'ades ), estimates of k1 were found to be insignificantly different from zero, as in Glosten and 
Harris [1989].6 This may be because informational innovations are infrequent so that they are
correlated with informed trade. 
In general, var( ei) is a function of the identity of the trader (informed or uninformed) at both
time s and time s - t. This more complicated relationship identifies the structural parameters
of the model. Those results are presented in section 7.2. 
Para.meter estimates are presented in Table 1. ..\ is the estimate of the slope of the spe­
cialist's pricing function in dollar price change per 1000 share trade, taking into account the
unobserva.bility of the sign of w. Therefore, if the price rises, pr(w > Olb.p > 0) will not be 
one. It is, however, increasing in the magnitude of the price movement. Except for ABC, there 
appears to be a significantly positive adverse selection component to the bid-ask spread.7 A 
appears to decrease with trading volume. Although the model places no restrictions on the 
relationship between firm size and adverse selection. this result would be consistent with Foster 
and Viswanathan's (1990] observation that less private information is available about large, 
frequently traded, securities. 
When the sample is divided into six trading hours, (see Table 2), we reject the hypothesis 
that ..\ and var( e) are constant a.cross the trading day ( x2( 10) = 24.13) . ..\is high during hours
1, 2, and 6. but it is also high during hour 4. The lack of systematic correlation between ..\and
price variance is even more pronounced for AAA. Here, we cannot reject the null hypothesis
that..\ is constant across the day (x2(10) = 5.15). 
Theory predicts that the adverse selection component is smaller at open and close if there 
is discretionary liquidity trade ( Bernhardt and Hughson [1992a.]). Unfortunately, the specialist 
pools orders on open and close, and we do not have a formal procedure for extracting net 
order flow from price and volume data.  \i\Te can still informally test the hypothesis that the 
adverse selection component is smaller on open and close by estimating the model during the 
first and la.st 15 minutes of the day assuming no pooling and including opening and closing 
6Hausman, Lo, and l\lach'.inlay (1992) find that . when t.hey account for discreteness, the time between trades
is indeed a determinant of t.he variance of public information release, which is consistent with our model. 
7Vlhen >. approaches zero, the algorithm GQOPT ceases t.o converge - there are no longer four independent 
first order conditions a t . t.he limit.  
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tra.des. However, we find tha.t .A is higher there tha.n a.t any other time. This suggests that
liquidity traders do not time their trades: Discretionary trade is not an important component 
of order flow. 
7.2. Structural parameter estimation 
Here we estimate the structural para.meters for the model in the absence of transaction costs 
(see appendix 3). Due to the shape of the likelihood function, gradient methods of estimation 
did not converge. Consequently, the maxima. were found using a grid search. Standard errors 
a.re also found numerically. 
Estimates a.re provided for Alcoa. Aluminum in Table 5. The structural para.meters are al
found to be statistically significa.nt. It is comforting to find that the estimates of the slope 
parameter, A, are similar in magnitude to those in Table 4. 
Previous literature attributes changes in ,\to changes in the "amount" of information about 
the stock. Our estimation procedure distinguishes between the "amount" of information and 
its "quality''. vVe find that v, the variance of inside information, is nearly constant throughout 
the clay. In Table .5, we see small changes in v accompanied by large changes in .A (see hours
2 and 3). However, <I>, the noise in the signal is much higher in the middle of the day. Thus,
changes in A appear to be almost completely determined by changes in ¢. 
For Alcoa ( AA), a 1000 share purchase ( approximately $60,000) results in a. ta.riff of $4.19 
due to adverse selection (see Table .5). Even for a 10,000 share trade, where the tariff rises to 
$419, it is still economically tiny, a.bout .1 % of the investment. For some securities, the adverse 
selection ta.riff is greater, up to $2000 for a 10,000 share (see Table 7), which is on the order 
of 1 % of the investment. Since these tariffs are small relative to the size of the price grid, it 
appears to be important to incorporate the discreteness of the price grid into the analysis. 
Over the day, the average informational innorntion exceeds an eighth, $'.1353, and the signal 
to noise ratio is about . .5. Not surprisingly, insiders trade much larger quantities than unin­
formed traders, averaging 7002 and 458 shares. respectively. See figure 10 for the distribution 
of traded quantities for the 5000 Alcoa. orders. While the estimated probability a given trader 
is informed is .43%. it is close to zero for small orders ( .03% for hundred share orders, .3% for 
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1000 share orders ), it rises precipitously between 1000 and 2000 shares (see figure 11). Except
for orders between 1000 and 2000 shares, it is relatively easy to distinguish informed trade from 
uninformed trade. The very low estima.te of informed trade for small orders suggests that fixed 
transaction costs discourage them from trading such quantities. 
Still, the small fraction of informed traders seems implausible. Examination of the special­
ist's zero profit condition (equation ( 4)) shows that the expected profits of the informed on
a 10000 share order are extremely high - almost $100,000, about $10 per share. When the 
nonlinear restrictions are rela.xed (see Table 6), the probability of an informed trader rises to
over 93, and the expected profits of the informed drop to a more reasonable $4200. 
In Table 6, the model is tested against two alternatives. F irst, the two nonlinear restrictions 
implied by the model a.re relaxed: we just estimate the reduced form parameters of the model. 
This exercise is, in some sense, equivalent to that in Glosten and Harris, who estimate an econo­
metric specification rather than a structural model. vVhen the mapping from the reduced form 
to the structural parameters is removed, some structural parameters are now unidentifiable, 
but the fit improves dramatically. We strongly reject the nonlinear restrictions imposed by the 
model (x2(2) = Gl2). Symptoms of the bad fit include the low probability of informed trade
and the unreasonably large profits of the insiders when they trade large quantities. While the 
slope of the pricing function and the quantities traded by market participants are unaltered, 
the probably of informed trade increases to over 9%. Second, the model is tested against a 
nonlinear rule. The immediate concern is whether the specialist is also inferring whether large 
trades are due to informed agents. As a simple diagnostic, we test the model against a quadratic 
pricing rule. Surprisingly the quadratic coefficient, d, is neither economically nor statistically 
significant. �We conjecture that d may be negative only because transaction costs are excluded 
from the model here. If the price increases by C whenever shares are bought, regardless of the
size of the order, a first order quadratic approximation without transaction costs would appear 
to be concave. 
Table 7 provides parameter estimates for other securities. Note that for smaller stocks (not 
ABC), both informed and uninformed agents tend to trade smaller quantities, and>. appears to 
be greater. Note also that AABC' is quite low: the adverse selection tariff is $1.90 for a thousand
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share order. This is consistent with the (lack of an) estimate for >.ABC in Table 1 .  
7.3. The Effect of Transaction Costs. 
W hen transaction costs are included, structural parameter estimation becomes infeasible. 
The structure of the model looks like the unrestricted alternative from Table 6 with the addition 
of transaction costs . W hen investors face a fixed cost to execute their trades, below a critical 
value ( b + £)*, there is no adverse selection problem. Figure 3 shows that ignoring the conse­
quences of c2 biases estimates of >. downward. The additional per-share cost, ci, paid to the
specialist, introduces serial correlation, so the past transaction history is relevant. The estima­
tion is complicated by the need to integrate over all possible transaction paths (see appendix 5) .  
The procedure is similar to that used to integra.te over all possible series of informed/uninformed 
indicators. Because the overnight non-trading period is long, a.nd there are presumably many 
informational innova.tions, we assume that the probability that the opening trade is a buy is 
� .  This significantly reduces the relevant number of potential transaction paths because the
likelihood of !:l.p8 depends only on trades which take place in the same day. Estimation of the 
critical level of trade w* below which no adverse selection problem exists involves including w 
as an explanatory variable above the critical level , and omitting it otherwise [Judge 1985 pp 
803-806] . 
vVe estimate ,\, the critical cutoff, and the variances of both informed and uninformed trade.
Results for Alcoa Aluminum ( AA )  are given in Table 8 . They indicate that the introduction
of transaction costs to the econometric model reduces >. to .0025, as predicted. Transaction 
costs are estimated to be about $ .032 per share and the critical cutoff is estimated to be 1300 
shares ( x2 (1 )  = 248 . :32( > .99) ) , which means that informed traders place few orders for Alcoa
of less than $6.5,000 . As one would hope, the estimated average trade sizes of both the informed 
and uninformed are unaffected by the introduction of transaction costs. The reason that this 
estima.te is unchanged ktha:t ·even without-transaction -costs, i;he ·estimated probability that an 
individual trading a quantity less than 1400 shares is informed is close to nil. 
6. Extensions and com1nents
6. 1 Event studies
22 
The methodology can be used to examine whether increased price variance a.round major 
events such as earnings, dividend, and merger announcements can be explained by an increase 
in the a.mount of inside information near the announcement dates. 
6.2 Cross-sectional tests
Informa.tiona.l events may affect more than a. single security. The analysis presented here 
can be extended to the case where there is contemporaneous correlation in informational inno­
vations a.cross securities, i .e. to where the informational innovations contain both a. common 
market-wide component and a. security-specific idiosyncratic component. However, there is the 
additional problem of non-synchronous trading a.cross securities: There is only partial overlap 
of price change intervals for different securities. Fortunately, the model implies the correlation 
between the regression errors of two securities is linear in the time overlap, and it is not difficult 
to apply a modified "seemingly unrelated" regressions technique to estimate the model. Given 
the a.mount of cross-sectional correlation in security returns, it is not unreasonable to expect 
a.n efficiency gain from this approach. Details a.re given in Bernhardt and Hughson [1992c] .
6.3.  Discreteness in prices and time between trades.
Harris [ 1986] , and Glosten and Harris [ 1989] recognize that transaction prices come from a. 
discrete price grid with increments of an eighth which is a.bout fifteen times the estimated per­
sha.re adverse selection component for a 1000 share order for Alcoa.. They assume that the "true 
value" is a. continuous variable and that a.gents round the price to the nearest eighth. They note 
that rounding is fundamentally ad-hoc. U nfortuna.tely, the magnitude of the error introduced 
by discreteness seems enormous relative to the information effects. Our results suggest that not 
only does discreteness play a.n important role in determining the price series, but it may also 
play a.n important role in determining the strategies of the potentially-informed agents, and 
hence, the specialist. These issues are examined in Bernhardt and Hughson [1992b] . 
7 .  Conclusion 
vVe develop a . model of insider trading on the NYSE which is consistent with many of 
the stylized facts found in the empirical literature. When markets are thin, we show that the 
specialist's pricing function is unaffected by the expected trade volume. This permits estimation 
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of the structural model. Since transactions are processed independently, we can incorporate 
transaction cost components into the model. Then the adverse selection component to the 
specialist 's pricing function vanishes for small transaction sizes, and the price series is negatively 
serially correlated. The theory imposes testable restrictions on transaction-by-transaction data. 
These econometric tests are performed using maximum likelihood estimation which takes into 
account the unobservability of the side of the trade taken by the market maker as well as the 
identity (informed or uninformed) of the trader. The theory provides additional non-linear
restrictions which identify of the structural parameters in the economy: the amount of private 
information, the noise in the signal, the cost of information, and the variance of uninformed 
trade. \Ve find that there is a substantial amount of private information, but the quality of 
an insider's signal is so bad that the estimated price impact of information is small. This 
may be due in part to the structure of the NYSE itself, in particular, the existence of limit 
orders and price continuity requirements for the specialist. This may cause the price impact 
of information to be spread over several trades. This may also minimize the apparent price 
impact of information of a single trade. 
vVhen fixed a.nd va.ria.ble tra.nsa.ction costs are introduced, estimation of the structural pa­
rameters is infeasible. However, a transaction cost component and a critical value below which 
no adverse selection exists emerges can be estimated. The critical cutoff is found to be large 
- insiders do not trade small qua.ntities. We strongly reject the linear pricing rule when it is
tested against the kinked alternative. This suggests that transaction costs are significant in 
limiting the ability of informed traders to divide their trades. 
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Table 1 :  Parameter Estimates** 
SYM FIRM TOTAL TRADES A var[e] µo µi 
TRADES INCL. 
AA Akoa Aluminum 13002 5000 .00420 .01790 .00131 - .00038 
( .00074) ( .00046) ( .00219) (.00032) 
AAA Amer. S & L of F L  2153 847 .05113 .02122 .00089 - .00061 
( .01303) ( .00100)  ( .00651 )  ( .00041)  
AAE Amerace Corp. 1903 709 .03138 .02232 .00790 - .00011 
( .00987) ( .00097) ( .00769) ( .00055) 
ABC Amer. Broadcasting Co. 10434 .5000 O* 
ABF Airborne F light Corp. 2323 945 . 0 1 117  .02471 .00397 - .00038 
( .00224) ( .00157) ( . 00670) ( .00045) 
ABT Abbot Corp. 10057 .5000 . 00580 . 01521 .00379 - .00037 
( .00090) ( .00033) ( .00230) ( .00026) 
ABY Albany International 3289 1788 .01498 .02838 .00103 .00062 
( .00838) ( .00085) ( .00494) ( .00039) 
ABZ Arkansas Best Corp. 1438 365 .03190 . 00962 - .00176 .00051 
( .00840) ( . 00066) ( .00763) ( . 00041) 
ACA Arcata Corp. 3150 1519 .00259 . 02092 .00959 - .00056 
( .00205) ( . 00074) ( .00050) ( .00033) 
* : Estimation procedure did not converge - all para.meters are not separately identified when A
is in the neighborhood of zero. 
Standard errors are given in parentheses directly below the point estimates. 
Appendix 1 .  tables
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Table 2 :  Hourly Estimates for Alcoa Aluminum (AA) and Amer. S & L of FL (AAA) 
µo µi 
HR TRADES .X var[e] trend components 
AA .00168 - .00033 
( .00219 )  ( . 00006) 
1 1068 .00502 .01834 
( .00199) ( .00084) 
2 1035 .00661 .01690 
( .00238) ( .00092)  
3 703 .00264 .01687 
( .00060 ) ( .00 1 16 )  
4 575 .00474 .01485 
( .00194) ( .00098 ) 
,5 750 .00367 .01874 
( .00104) ( .00095 ) 
6 857 .00447 .02048 
( .00218) ( .00164 ) 
AAA .00781 - .00057 
( .00675 ) ( .00327) 
1 203 .0.5678 .02299 
( .01 193) ( .00204 ) 
2 249 .0261 7  .02399 
( .03658 ) ( .00192 ) 
3 1 12 .08025 .0 184 1  
( .03130 ) ( .00274 ) 
4 84 - .00735 . 0 1797 
( .27496 ) ( .00278 ) 
,5 1 1-!  .00000 .02229 
( .00466 ) ( .00231 )  
6 85 .07251 .0 1957 
( .02.5.52 ( .00327 ) 
Standard errors a.re given in parentheses directl,\1 belmv the point estimates.
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Table 3 :  Estimates of Price and Volume for Alcoa Aluminum (AA) and Amer. S & L of FL
(AAA) 
SYM HR VAR( price) E[w:l]* E[lw lJ SAMPLE
per 1000 thousands SIZE 
AA ALL 0 .01813 12 .692 1 .266 5000 
1 0 .01862 10 .569 1 .354 1 068 
2 0 .01724 8.281 1 . 182 1035 
3 0 .01698 1 7 .461 1 . 2 1 1  703 
4 0 .01485 15 .585 1 .373 575 
,5 0 .01899 18.228 1 . :3 19  750 
6 0 .02050 9 .888 1 . 18.5 857 
AAA ALL 0.02245 0 .443 0 .399 847 
1 0 .02503 0 .650 0 .483 203 
2 0 .02277 0 .446 0. 362 249 
3 0 .01996 0.323 0 .363 1 12  
4 0 .01734 0.28.5 0 .364 84 
,5 0 .02246 0 .297 0.396 1 14 
6 0.02207 0.451 0. 392 85 
* E[(volurne )2] is a measure of var[w], because the theory implies that E[w] = 0.
Table 4: Comparison of Pricing Functions :  OLS vs . Maximum Likelihood (table 1 ) 
SYM ,\ var[e] ,\ var[e]
(OLS ) ( OLS ) table 1 table 1 
AA .009 . 0 17  .004 .018 
AAA . 1 13 .017 .051 .021 
AAE .098 .018 .031 .022 
ABC .00.5 .010 * * 
ABF .017 .023 . 0 1 1  .02.5 
ABT .013 .014 .006 .01.5 
ABY .037 :026 .01.5 :-028 
ABZ .06.5 .007 .032 .010 
ACA .010 .020 .002 .021 
* : Estimation procedure did not converge - all para.meters are not separately identified when ,\
is in the neighborhood of zero . See appendix 4 for detai ls .
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v variance of inside information 
.01829 I .01888 I . 01736 I . 0 1704 I . 01536 I . 0 192 1  I .02096 ( .00037) ( .00084) ( .00077) ( .0009 1 )  ( .00924) ( .00101 )  ( .00103) 
</> noise in the signal 
.08212  I .07315  I . 1 1480 I . 1 .5360 I .05075 I 
.072 1 1  I . 05401 ( .02404 ) ( .04194) ( . 08388 ) ( . 1 6 1 74 )  ( . 03239) ( .04988) ( . 04988) 
a variance of uninformed trade 
.20940 I .2239.5 I .20938 I .20777 I . 14253 I . 18319 I .23239 ( .00334 ) ( .00759 )  ( .00888 ) ( .00765 ) ( .00691 )  ( . 00769) ( .00904) 
c cost of information ($ ) 
20 .213 18 .933 13 .826 17 .293 2 1 .  709 27. 1 99 24.231 
( 2  . . 5 .53 ) (4 .614)  (4.532 ) ( 8 .406) (5 .784) ( 7. 927) ( 5 . 747) 
ECONOMIC PARA.METERS 
,\ slope of specialist's pricing function
.00412 1 .00.5 12  I .00412  I .00246 I .004 1 1  I .003114 I .00604 
Adverse selection tariff for a 1 ,000 share order , $ (AW )2
4 .1 2  I .5 . 12 I 4 . 12 I 2 .46 I 4 . 1 1  I 3 .11  I 6.o4 
Adverse selection tariff for a 10 ,000 share order, $ ( .\w)2
412 .00 I .5 12 .00 I 412.00 I 246 . oo I 41i .oo I 31i .oo I 604.oo 
() ex-ante probability that a trader is informed 
.0042.5 I .00502 I .00621 I .00295 I .00259 I .00250 I . 00584 
fo average size of an uninformed trade ( shares ) 
458 I 473 I 458 I 456 I 378 I 428 I 485 
average size of an informed trade ( shares ) 
1002 I 6083 I 5190 J f.::384 J 1261 I 8558 I 6332 
,,JV average size of price shock $ 
. 1 :3.53 J . 1374 J . 1318  I . 1 :30.5 I . 1 240 I . 1 386 I . 1448 
./¢ average a.mount of noise $ 
.2866 .2705 .3388 . :3919 .2253 .2685 .2324 
Standard errors a.re given in parentheses directly below the point estimates . 
Test of whether hourly para.meter estimates significantly differ from each other: (x2 (20) = 
152.002( > .99.5 ) )  
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Table 6 :  Test of Nonlinear Restrictions Implied by the Model - Test of Linearity of the Pricing 
Function - for Alcoa Aluminum 
THE I UNRESTRICTED I MODEL ALTERNATIVE NONLINEAR RULE 
STRUCTURAL PARAMETERS 
v variance of inside information 
. 0 1829 I 
* 
I( .00037) * 
¢ noise in the signal
. 08212 I
* 
I( . 02404) * 
a variance of uninformed trade 
.20940 I .20843 I( .00334) ( .00448) 
c cost of information ( $ )  
20.213 I : I ( 2  . .553 ) 
ECONOMIC PARAMETERS 
slope of specialist 's pricing function 




( . 01472) 
.20948 
( .00334) 
2 1 . 728 
( 1 .972) 
.00444 
* 
Adverse selection tariff for a 1 ,000 share order, $ ( Aw)2
4. 12 1 4 . 1 9  1 4.44 
Ad verse selection tariff for a 1 0  ,000 share order, $ (AW )2 
4 12.00 1 419 .oo 1 444 .oo 
d quadratic pricing function term 
: I : I 
() ex-ante probability that a trader is informed 
. 0042.5 1 . 09048 1
* ( .00767)  
fo average size of an uninformed trade ( shares )
4.58 1 457 1 
average size of an informed trade ( shares ) 
7002 1 8049 1
* (369.39.5 ) 
JV average size of price shock $ 
. 1 3.53 I * I
V<f> average amount of noise $ 
.2866 I * I 
- .0000140 






. 1 3.55 
.2627 
* : The nonlinear restrictions identify some, but not all structural parameters.
Standard errors are given in parentheses directly below the point estimates . 
Test against unrestricted alternative: ( x2 ( 2 )  = 612.0.59 ! (>  .999 ) ) .
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Table 7: Structural Parameter Estimates other NYSE Securities 
SYMBOL AAA I AAE I ABC I ABF I ABT TRADES 1380 1 187 2000 945 2000 
STRU CTURAL PARAMETERS 
v variance of inside information 
.02392 I .02380 I .0 1 1 50 I .02
.571 
I . 01563 ( . 00092 ) ( .00092 ) ( .00037 ) ( .00 1 1 8 )  ( .00048) 
<!> noise in the signal 
.05379 I .81912 I .05457 I .04121  I . 1 6636 ( .02044 ) ( . . 57903 ) ( .0 1604 ) ( .020:3 .5 ) ( . 1440 1 )  
(1 variance of uninformed trade 
.0566 1 .0606 1 .4332 1 . 1394 1 .2323 ( .02056 ) ( .00230 ) ( .0 1881 ) ( .0 1259 ) ( .00584) 
c cost of information ($ ) 
9 . 1 14 1 2 .025 1 26.343 1 33 .824 1 1 1 . 1 71 
( 1 .3236 ) ( . 70085 ) (3 .4378 ) ( 6 .0060 ) ( 4 .5367) 
ECONOMIC PARAMETER S 
,\ slope of specialist 's pricing function
.0202 I .0083 1 .0019 I .0013 I .0031 
Adverse selection tariff for a 1 .000 share order, $ ( ,\w)2
20.20 I 8.3o I i .90 I 1 . :30 I 3 . 1 0  
Adverse selection tariff fo r  a 10 .000 share order , $ ( ,\w)2 
2020.00 I s3o.oo 1 1 90 .00 1 730 .00 I 310 .00 
() ex-ante probability that a trader is informed 
. 0 1 2:39 I .02424 I .003 1 1  I .00:300 1 .00630 
Va awrage size of an  uninformed t rade ( shares ) 
nx I 246 I 6.5s I :3 1:3 1 482 
averag<> size of an informed tra d e  ( shares ) 
: n24 I 1.s6 1 I 1 1 775 1 (jso, I 6052 
/I' average size of price shock $ 
. 1 041 I . 1 .s43 I . 1 073 I . rno3 I . 1250 
vo a\'erage amount of noise Si 
. 2:n9  j �0.51  I .23:t6 I .:20 :30 I .4046 







Table 8 :  Tra.nsa.ction Cost Parameter Estimation for Alcoa. Aluminum (AA) 
NO TC I FIXED I FIXED + VARIABL ETC TC 
PARAMETERS 
variance of uninformed tra.de 
.2084 1 . 208.5 1 .2085 
( .00448 ) ( .00449 )  ( .00448 ) 
variable transaction cost ( $ )
: I .03210 I .03210  ( . 00347 )  ( .00:320 ) 
critical cutoff ( shares) 
* I * I 1400 
slope of specialist 's pricing function 
.00419 1 .00250 I .00250 ( .00070 ) ( .00069 ) 
ex-ante probability that a. trader is informed 
. 09048 1 .090.50 I . 090.50 ( .00767 ) ( .00767 ) 
average size of a.n uninformed trade ( shares ) 
4.57 1 4.57 I 4,57 
average size of a.n informed tr a.de ( sh a.res ) 
8049 1 8062 1 8049 
( 369.395 ) ( :369.399 ) 
* : The nonlinear restrictions identify some, b11t not a.11 structural para.meters .
Standard errors a.re given in parentheses directly below the point estimates. 
Test of linear rule vs . kinked a.I terna.tive: ( y2 ( 1 )  = 10 .  /00( > . 99) ) .
Appendix 2. Integration of t ransaction costs 
P roof to lemma 2: An agent who has paid a cost c to become informed now solves:
Differentiating with respect to Xi and applying the projection theorem yields:  
[ v( b + €) ] 1 
Xi = 




An informed agent will not sell (buy) if he receives a signal greater (less)  than zero. 
Proof to lemma 2a: b can be written as: 
b = E(b J b  + €) + � .
Applying the projection theorem, 
(20) 
To calculate the var[b J b  + €}, we first compute the variances of both sides of (20). This yields :
v2 
V = --. + Wlr( �).
v + <t> 
Since E[b j b  + €] i s  not random, var(O = var[ b j b  + €]. Thus,  var[(] = vv_/<P . To obtain E(( b +
E)2 j b  + E], recall that var[b j b  + €] = E[b2 j b  + f] - ( E[b j b  + €])2.
Then to obtain E[bf jb + f], observe that E[( b + €)2 j b  + €] = E[b2 j b  + €] + E[2'5Ej b  + €] +
E[f2 j b  + €] = [b + €]2. Solving for E[f2 j b  + €] as above and t hen solving for E[2bfj b  + €] yields
the result . • 
Simplifying assumptions used to produce figures 2-9. 
U nder the assun1ptions tha:t 6, €, and z aJ'e standa:rd nonnal random -varia:bles ,
so that ( 17 ) reduces to :  
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Substituting w = b + E and switching the order of integration, the left-hand side of (21) becomes:
- [4wb - w2Je-8 l2e-(w-S) 12dbdw = 1 J
oo 100 2 2 
27r vsc;\ -O::• 
- 4wew 14 be-(S-w/2) dbdw - - w2ew 14 e-(S-w/2) d8dw.
1 
J
oo 2 loo 2 1 1= 2 1= 2 
211" vsc;\ -= 211" yf8c2.\ -= 
Substituting x = ,/26 - w/,/2, we obtain:
Noting that :  
this reduces to 
-- w2e - w  14dw .j<X) 1 2 
vsc;\ 2,fi 
Integrating by parts , letting u = w and dv = w e - 1"2 /4 and solving, the left-hand side equals :
Solving implicitly for A yields the result . The same integration techniques are adopted to  solve 
the general problem with arbitrary variances, v. </> and a .  • 
Appendix 3. Derivation of the unconditional joint density of /j.ps and lws I 
in the absence of transaction costs 
Under weak regularity conditions ( Amemiya [ 1 98.5] ) , maximum likelihood maximizers { u( B)}
a.re consistent efficient estimators of { 1t ( /30 )}  for mixtures of normal distributions .  Let L(/3) = 
L( f:..p, lw l ,  /3)  he unconditional likelihood function for the price series for f:..p and lw l .  The error, 
e8 is conditionally normally distributed with mean zero and variance CTj , where j = 1 if the
specialist faced an informed trader at time s - t ( probability (}) and j = 2 if the specialist  faced 
an uninformed trader then ( probability 1 - B). Let !8 , the bid-ask indicator, equal one if a
trader is buying and minus one if he is selling. Finally, w is conditionally normally distributed 
with mean zero and variance a w ,  where w = :3 if the specialist faces an informed agent at time
s (probability B )  and w = 4 if that agent is uninformed (probability 1 - B) .
Given our assumptions,  the conditional density of b.p8 given past prices , bid-ask indicator, 
I8 ,  variance indicators , j and w, is given by: 
1 -( L'>ps-Alws lls)2 
fs (b.p, /3 II, j, •) = �
e 2ai (22) 
Integrating over the unconditional marginal distribution for the bid-ask indicator Is 8 yields :
1 1 -(Ll.ps -.X lws ll2 1 1 -(L!.p.+.Xlws l)2 
fs (b.p, f3 lj, • ) = 2 �
e 2uJ + 2 �e
2uj (23) 
Glosten and Harris [1989] would write this as the unconditional density for b.p8 in the absence 
of transaction costs .  9 Here we must still integrate over the unconditional marginal density 
for j .  In general, the probability a particular agent is informed is a function of t he trade size. 
Define (}� as the pr( informedl lws l ) .  Using Ba.yes '  rule yields:
(}� = (e;a:te ;;: ) (e;a:te ;;: + ( 1  - O)y'(i3e ;;: ) -1 (24) 
Now: 
Using information in the price series only, the unconditional likelihood function is :  
n 
L ((3 )  = II .fs ( .0.pl • ) . 
s=1 
8 In this model . huying and selling is equally likely. However, this procedure can accommodate more compli­
cated forms for this distrihution , for example, serial correlation. Serial correlation might arise due to portfolio 
insurance strategies. 
9 However, the�· est.imate a model with transact.ion cost.:>. In addition, their model places no structure on the 
probability the specialist faces an informed trader. Instead . they assume that traded quantities are normally 
distributed. Therefore, their unconditional likelihood function is an equally weighted average over 2" unobserved 
bid-ask paths (Ji , . . .  , !11 ) of the conditional densities detailed above. That is:
2n u 
L(g(D )p, {3 )  = L 21" II J,(6.p, f3II, • ) .  
1 , = ]  
This can he compu ted recursively, as detailed i n  Glost.en and Harris [1989]. 
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However, the volume series provides additional information .  Integrating over the unconditional 
marginal distribution for w, we find the unconditional density for w5 : 
O' -w2 ( 1 - 01 ) -w29s ((w) I • ) = s e"2ci'3 + 8 e 2a4 , 
,,/27f<73 ,,/27f<74 
Unfortunately, i t  is not appropriate to write some hs = !s9s and then write the unconditional 
likelihood function as f1�=l hs( .6.plw l •  ) . The reason is that lagged w 's determine <7j and current
w 's determine the distribution for <7w · The unconditional likelihood function L has a recursive 
structure. 
Define J.;" as the conditional joint density of ..:::i.ps and w8 , where the first superscript indicates 
whether the trader at t. ime .s - t was informed and the second superscript indicates whether the
trader a.t time 8 is  informed . Let * = i if  a. trader is i nformed and u otherwise. Thus:




Now defi ne /� = f.�i + .f.�' i a.n d /�1 = J111 + !�' " .  Also. let Ll = Jf + fl .  Now:
I n  ge1w ral : 
w here: 
a n d .  
l = J' ( !ii + !"' ) + (" ( r11i + 1uu ) -J.<; 8- f  S ,<, • s - /  . S .'i ' 
Ji r' r ' ,.  + r" rtt
i
S - · S- / 0 8 · S- f • S ' 
! 11 = !' !'" + f" {" " . s , - /  s . s - t . s 
l n d ('x i n g  by t ra 1 1 s a c t  ion 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 lw r  ra t  IH'r  t h a n  h.\· t ra nsaction time yields :
I !' ( !' ' !"' ) (" ( ! '" + !U lt ) ' II = 1 1 - f  I I  + I• + . 11 - J  I! II ' 
: 1 .-, 
where Ln = L( �p, lwl  I •) .  If there is a break in the transaction price series for any reason, e.g.
the end of the day, we restart the iterative process . That is, O�-t is reset to 0. Thus, the log
of the likelihood function becomes the sum of the log likelihoods over the regions where the 
iteration occurs.  Were there M breaks ,  the log of the likelihood, LL,  would be  represented by:
]If 
LL = L log[Lnm] 
m=l 
This assumption makes the most sense overnight , where there is a long interval without t rade: 
Information release continues overnight . When a break occurs in the middle of the d ay, we prefer 
to throw away information rather than pollute the time series by introducing observations which 
may be generated by a. different forcing process .
In general, the likelihood function depends on the parameters >.,  ai , a2 , a3 , a4 , and 0. 
However, these are functions of structural parameters , v, </>, c ,  a, and k,  a scaling constant
which is needed because time periods are not necessarily scaled in minutes. In t he estimation, 
we finesse this issue by assuming that there is a single innovation between trades . 
Reca11: 
v2 2c av2 
>- =  ; /3 = - : B - -----4c( v + 4>) v a v2 + 4c2( v + </>) ·
In addition , a1 = E[( b - >.w )2 l infornied trader] and a2 = E[(8 - >.w)2 luninformed trader] .
By substituting for A and recalling that a3 = !32 (  11  + 4> )  and a4 = a, we obtain:
Appendix 4 .  Derivation of the likelihood function used in table 1 
Variable transaction costs are not considered ( c1 = 0) .  Also, e5 has constant variance.
As a result , this likelihood function need not be derived recursively. Recall that Jt = 1 only
if w exceeds the cutoff w* . As a diagnostic, we su htract p0 + ft1 t to check for deterministic
components to price changes . Therefore, -2log[l (p )] - ( constant) can be written as:
n t 6p--\j'"• I Jt -;<o -µ1 1 )2 (.C.p+-\lw lJt -µ0-µ1 t)2 ] } - 2/ogL = L { tog( var( et) ) - 2log [e 2 v u r( e )  + e 2var(e) 
t=l 
3G 
Define t he expression in square brackets as Tl + T2, where Tl is the first exponential, and T2 
- El -E2 
the second. Further, let Tl = e 2var(e) and T2 = e 2 1'ar( e ) . Taking the derivatives with respect to







� [ -1 2 2 ] 




All four para.meters a.re theoretically i dentified, except when >. approaches zero. Then, Tl
approaches T2, and ( 2.5) collapses to zero, leaving the first derivative matrix short of full rank. 
Appendix 5 .  Derivation of the likelihood function with transaction costs
Recall that .Is = 1 if w > w* . Let Ks = 1 if Is = 1 and Is-t = -1; Ks = -1 if Is = -1 and
Is-t = 1; and Ks = 0 otherwise. That i s ,  there is no bid-ask "bounce" if Is-t = Is .  
\t\Te begin by writing the conditional density for !lps : 
where • = b if i = 1 and s otherwise. Glosten and Harris [1989) have Js = 1, and do not
distinguish between informed and uninformed traders . They need only weight the 2n possible 
bid-ask paths to construct the likelihood function for !lp. 
Here , estimation is complicated by the dependence of CTj on past realizations of volume,
Ws-t , due to the unobserved identity ( informed or uninformed ) of the trader in both at time t 
and at time t - 1. Thus, we also weight over a.1 1 possible sequences of identities . We write the
likelihood function in pieces in order to highlight its recursive construction. Define 
where the four arguments in the superscript of f,�··• are: { i, u }n-1 '  { i, u }ni { b, s }n-1 ' { b, s }n·
The first argument is  i if an informed agent traded in period n - 1 and u otherwise; the second
argument is i if an informed agent traded in perfod n and v. otherwise; the third argument is
b if an agent bought in period n - 1 and s otherwise; and the fourth argument is b if an agent
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bought in  period n a.nd s otherwise. pr(• •  •• ) is the proba.bility of a. pa.rticular state occurring.
Note that when w is below the critical cutoff, the proba.bility of an informed trader must be 
zero. The recursive structure is similar to tha.t given in appendix 3 ,  but there are now more 
terms :  
where: 
Ln J�b_1 [f�ibb 
+ J�ibs + J�ubb + J�ubs] + J�8_l [j�isb + J�iss + J�usb + J�uss] +
J�b_l u::ibb + J::ibs + gubb + 1::11bs l + f�b_l u::isb + giss + 1::usb + 1::ussl
fib = Jib Jiibb + Jis fiisb + f"b Juibb + Jus Juisbn n-1 n n- 1 . n . n-1 n n-1 n ' 
!is = fib fiibs + !is fiiss + r11b fuibs + 1us fuissn n-1 n n - 1  n . n-1 n n - 1  n ' 
f11b = fib fiubb + !is fiusb + rub fuubb + !us fuusb. n n-1 n n - 1  n . n-1 n n-1 n ' 
!tis = fib fiubs + !is fiuss + r11b fuubs + !us fuussn n-1 n n- 1 n • n-1 n n- 1 n • 
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Fi�ure 2: Share Transaction Price with Transaction Cost




;E 1 0.0 
QJ 
N. I ..;t 
... 






7 5 0  -750 -500 -250 0 250 5 00 
Trade Quantity (negali\'e=sell) 











0 . 0  0 . 2  0 . 4  0 . 6  0 . 8  1 . 0 




Z!., % , E.  ....... Nco, n ; c1 == 0 
Trad 1 n9 c..o s+s a le f1 xe.d only.
c:f) 
-'1' 
Figure 4: Lambda, Pi/Eta vs. Trading Costs, c= l .  




t;! - A. 
� -- nlrl ..;:t ..;:t 
0.050 z, S, € ,....., N (o, 1 ) ; C 1 = 0 
Trad ing costs a re.. fn ced 011ly.
0.025 
0.000 -+-----.----.------..-----r---.,.---.,.----,-----,.---.------i 
0 . 0  0 . 2  0 .4  0 .6  0 .8  1 . 0 
Trading Co!>ls ( c l +c2) 
.... 
= 

















0.0 0 . 2  0.4  0.6 0.8 1 .0 
Trading Costs (cl+c2) 
Probo b d 1+y s1 qn a l  1.s sme l l  ehough 
that 1 nfo rrn e.a canrio+ recou p 
-rrod 1 n 3  costs by -t r-..1d m3  . 
i!: , 'b , E rV N (0, 1 ) � C 1 = 0
Tra d  1 ng costs a re  fr'><e.d ol'"'I)'.





Guont 1 1y be.l o·.·: 1\ h 1d 1  tra de
by 1 r ifot r ned 1 S  un p 1  cif i t <.\ b le .  
1 .0 
0.5 
0 0  l--.---,--r--,,--.---,--.--,--.---1 
( ) .  () 0 . 2  0 . 4  0 . 6  0 . 8  I . 0 
























0 . 1  
0.0 ---.---.----..-----.---....---...--....---.----.----i 
0 . 0  0 . 2  0 . 4  0 . 6  0.8  1 . 0 
Trading Cosls (cl+c2) 
Proba b i l dy s 1 9 , w \  • :i  :; rn'-r l l  enough 
tho-t 1 nformea cannot recou p 
fi xed co:::i"\-s by fra d 1 •)<j ·  
�� 6 ,  E rv  NCo,1 ) ;  C1 = Q 
Tra d  1 ng c.os t::i o re ·f r:-. e.d C;r i i / 










0 () () 2 0.4 0.6 
Trading Costs (cl+c2) 
0 . 8  1 .0 
Qu ant ity belov/ ·11h 1 c\ i �rr·r.de
by i n fo r med t '.':.  1.m 1 • l ' )T 1  ta6\e . 






0 . 3  0.4 0 . 5  0.6 0.7  0 . 8  0 .9 1 .0 
c/c* 








I , I 
0.35 
0.]0 
!U 0 . 4  0 . 5  0 . 6  0 . 7  0 . 8  0 . 9  1 . 0 
c/c* 
Lacnbd a r 1 :; e s  o s  1 nforn 1 ot lein 
oc.qu 1 "5 1 t 1 o n  co st c.o m e r 1 s 1.:� s 
'..l t lt c�j€' V  froct 1 0 11 of +·1 x e.cl 
costs . 
:. 1  b i  e rv N (011 ) ; � 1 = 0 , , 
Tro e\ i 113 costs are f1 xe.iJ on1 ; .
Prq b a  b i  h t\ s pe.c.1 a h  s+  F0ce5 u ri
1 nta11 n ed tra der- o h o r'l c: e �  
a s  oc.1u 1 s 1 .t i o n  cos+ c�m p r- 1  s es 








Q ,_ c.. 
� N 
Ci.i 













0 . 1  
0.0 
0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0 .7 0 . 8  0 . 9  1 .0 
c/c* 








0 .3  O A  0 . 5  0 . 6  0.7  0 . 8  0.9 1 . 0 
c/c* 
Tii�;,, ; ; \ -:) ho b t  i 1 tY. a n  ! , ,,f,'Jr· i � 1 f:'d 
tr-ad'e r- w 1  I I  wa I �  wnay .w 1 th a\A+ 
rr·ad p i·t_ de.c.re O':.>C'.S ,"1 $  �Tod : rt u 
costs -=ra r n-i o srno \ 11er : � t\ r ·t,
) 
of -f1 xed co"Ots .
· 
� )  b } E IV N ( 0J1 ) � c \ ::-. 1.') 
T\ ·oc L0� co-s ts q r c f1 xed o n  
\y
As tra d \ ,· 1q c.os b1 1. \ ; , 1 : i ·. : ·,,:h  
1�\at1 \/c +d ac.q_'J. 1 � 1  + -, .-, , :  cost5,. 












Figure 9: Trading Cost vs. Trade Size, Different Txn Costs 
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